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The debate over a new farm bill has focused on how to spend an additional $73.5 
billion in funding for the agricultural budget over ten years. The House of 
Representatives, the Senate Agriculture Committee, and Senators Cochran and Roberts 
(supported by the Bush Administration) have each proposed a structure for the next 
farm bill. A critical question becomes whether these proposals conflict with U.S. 
commitments to limit subsidies under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreement. This paper explores this issue and concludes with a discussion of the future 
direction of U.S. farm subsidies and new WTO agreements. 
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Introduction 
T he debate over a new farm bill began in earnest last year with hearings in both the Senate and House Agriculture Committees. The stakes of the debate were 
raised when Congress set aside an additional $73.5 billion in funding for the 
agricultural budget over ten years. The House passed its version of the farm bill (H.R. 
2646) in the fall of 2001. The Senate Agriculture Committee passed a farm bill (S. 
1731), but the full Senate has not yet agreed on the direction in which it wants to take 
farm policy, other than that it wants to spend the full $73.5 billion. Farm lobbyists and 
farm-state legislators have convinced the Bush Administration of the need to spend 
the additional $73.5 billion. The Administration has come out in support of a farm bill 
proposal created by Senators Cochran and Roberts – a plan that was rejected by the 
Senate in December.  
With each new farm bill, the array of federal agricultural programs is modified. 
New programs are added while some existing programs are changed or eliminated. 
Individual programs are designed to address specific issues in agriculture. The federal 
crop insurance program provides producers with subsidized insurance for their crop 
yields and/or revenues. Marketing loan programs guarantee farmers a minimum price 
for their products. Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments provide income 
support to the agricultural sector.  
The emergency agricultural support packages of the last four years have led many 
to conclude that the current farm program does not provide adequate support to 
farmers and that federal agricultural expenditures are too low. Thus many are looking 
to change the existing policy. The proposed changes range from modifications of 
existing programs to creation of new ones.  
Much of the discussion thus far has focused on the countercyclical nature (or lack 
thereof) of farm programs. Within the current programs, the marketing loan and crop 
insurance programs are countercyclical because expenditures increase in response to a 
decline in either price or yield. Marketing loan payments increase with lower prices. 
Crop insurance indemnities accrue when yield and/or revenue falls below set levels. 
PFC payments are not countercyclical because they are fixed throughout the life of the 
program. 
While the outcome of the farm bill debate is in some doubt, there seems no doubt 
that additional subsidies will be given to agriculture over the next ten years. A critical 
question becomes whether these subsidies conflict with our commitments to limit 
subsidies under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. This paper explores 
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this issue. The first step in this exploration is to summarize the three leading 
proposals. Each builds on the existing structure of the current farm bill, while adding 
additional programs to provide support to agricultural producers. Section III then 
presents the terms of our commitments to the WTO. Section IV presents estimates of 
WTO compliance of the current farm bill. Section V presents estimates of WTO 
compliance under the three proposals and discusses the likelihood that farm subsidies 
could exceed our commitments. The paper concludes with a discussion of the future 
direction of U.S. farm subsidies and new WTO agreements.  
Alternative Farm Bil l  Proposals 
T he House farm bill continues fixed decoupled payments (like the PFC payments), maintains the marketing loan program, elevates soybeans and minor oilseeds to 
program crop status, and creates a new countercyclical program. The fixed decoupled 
payments are based on a combination of payment yields, acreage, and payment rates. 
The payment yields for the new payments are the same as those that are used in the 
current PFC payments, with the exception of soybeans, for which yields are based on 
average yields over the 1981-1985 period (the same period over which the other 
program crops established their program yields). The payment acreage is set at either 
the farm’s current payment acreage for PFC payments or the 1998-2001 average 
planted acreage for all program crops on the farm. The House farm bill also follows 
the PFC program convention of payment on only 85 percent of eligible acres. The 
payment rates are set slightly higher than the PFC payment rates for 2002 and are 
locked in for the entire life of the bill. For the marketing loan program, the major 
changes are in the loan rate settings. The soybean loan rate is lowered to $4.92 per 
bushel, the barley loan rate is capped at $1.65 per bushel, the oat loan rate has a 
maximum level of $1.21 per bushel, and the sorghum loan rate is raised to $1.89 per 
bushel. Soybeans and minor oilseeds would be eligible for both the fixed decoupled 
and countercyclical payments under the bill. However, producers must choose to 
update program acreage to enroll soybean and minor oilseed acreage. The 
countercyclical program pays producers when prices fall below a set level. Target 
prices are established for each of the program crops. Under the House bill, the 
effective market price is calculated as the sum of the maximum of the crop’s loan rate 
or twelve-month national average farm price and the payment rate for the fixed 
decoupled payments. When the effective market price is less than the target price, 
producers receive a payment with the rate equal to the difference between the target 
price and the effective market price. The payment yields and acreage from the fixed 
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decoupled payments are also used in the countercyclical program. Thus, the House 
countercyclical program uses a fixed payment base, but a variable payment rate that is 
responsive to current prices. The variable payment rate is maximized when the 
twelve-month national average farm price is below the loan rate. The House farm bill 
covers the 2002-2011 crop years. 
The Senate Agriculture Committee farm bill follows the basic structure of the 
House farm bill. It continues fixed decoupled payments, maintains the marketing loan 
program, elevates soybeans and minor oilseeds to program crop status, and creates a 
new countercyclical program. It is in the details of the programs that the differences 
arise. The fixed decoupled payments have different payment rates and allow for 
updating on both payment acreage and yield. Payment acreage may be based on either 
current PFC acreage or 1998-2001 average planted acreage. Payment yield may be 
based on either current PFC yields or 1998-2001 average yields (after some 
adjustments). The payments are based on 100 percent of eligible production, as 
opposed to 85 percent for both current law and the House farm bill. Also, soybean and 
minor oilseed acreage can be enrolled in the program without updating payment 
acreage on other crops. The fixed payment rates are set near the 2002 PFC rates in the 
beginning. In 2004, the fixed payment rates are reduced by 50 percent. (The exception 
to this is for sorghum, where the fixed payment rate is set at $0.31 per bushel in 2002 
and $0.135 per bushel in 2004.) Another 50 percent reduction in rates is scheduled for 
2006. Marketing loan rates are raised for all eligible crops, except soybeans where the 
loan rate is lowered to $5.20 per bushel. The countercyclical program has a structure 
quite similar to the House proposal. It pays producers when prices fall below a set 
level. Income protection prices are established for each of the program crops. Under 
the Senate Agriculture Committee bill, the effective market price is calculated as the 
sum of the maximum of the crop’s loan rate or five-month national average farm price 
(the first five months of the marketing year) and the payment rate for the fixed 
decoupled payments. When the effective market price is less than the income 
protection price, producers receive a payment with the rate equal to the difference 
between the income protection price and the effective market price. The payment 
yields and acreage from the fixed decoupled payments are also used in the 
countercyclical program. Thus, the Senate Agriculture Committee’s countercyclical 
program uses a fixed payment base, but a variable payment rate that is responsive to 
current prices. The variable payment rate is maximized when the five-month national 
average farm price is below the loan rate. Also, given the initial settings of the loan 
rates, income protection prices, and fixed decoupled payment rates, the 
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countercyclical program under the Senate Agriculture Committee proposal cannot 
make any payments until 2004. The Senate Agriculture Committee farm bill covers 
the 2002-2006 crop years. 
The Cochran-Roberts farm bill also continues fixed decoupled payments, 
maintains the marketing loan program, elevates soybeans and minor oilseeds to 
program crop status, and creates a new countercyclical program. The payment acreage 
for the fixed decoupled payments is established at either the current PFC base for the 
farm, the current PFC base for the farm plus 1998-2001 average acreage planted to 
soybeans and minor oilseeds, or the 1998-2001 average acreage planted to all program 
crops. Payment yields are set at the current PFC payment yields, except for soybeans 
and minor oilseeds, which are paid on yields calculated by the product of the farm’s 
1998-2001 average oilseed yield and the ratio of national average oilseed yields for 
1981-1985 and 1998-2001. Payment rates are significantly higher than the 2002 PFC 
payment rates. And, as with the House bill’s fixed decoupled payments and PFC 
payments, only 85 percent of eligible production receives a payment. The marketing 
loan provisions follow the House bill. The new countercyclical program is a farm 
savings account program. The program is structured to compensate for declines in 
gross revenue. Adjusted gross revenue is calculated as the sum of gross receipts from 
all agricultural enterprises (except tobacco), insurance indemnities, and government 
payments, less the costs of items purchased for resale (such as feeder cattle). Targets 
are established at the five-year average of adjusted gross revenue. For producers to 
qualify for the farm savings account program, they must have a five-year average 
adjusted gross revenue of at least $20,000 (with exceptions for limited-resource and 
beginning producers). The accounts are funded by producer contributions and 
government matching funds. The accounts have a maximum limit of 150 percent of 
the five-year average adjusted gross revenue on the farm, and the government 
matching funds are limited to a maximum of $10,000 per account per year. Total 
matching funds are limited to $800 million in 2002. This limit increases by $100 
million each year until 2006. The accounts are allowed to earn interest at commercial 
rates. Producers can withdraw money from the accounts either when realized adjusted 
gross revenue is less than 90 percent of their five-year average adjusted gross revenue 
or when the producer retires. The Cochran-Roberts bill covers the 2002-2006 crop 
years. 
To provide a quick summary of main differences among the proposals, we have 
placed the various program loan rates, fixed payment rates, and target or income 
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protection prices in tables 1 to 3. Where applicable, we have also included figures 
from the current farm bill. 
 
Table 1  Marketing Loan Rates ($/yield unit) 
 
Crop 2001 Actual House Senate Ag. Comm. Cochran-Roberts 
Barley 1.65 1.65 2.00 1.65 
Corn 1.89 1.89 2.08 1.89 
Cotton 0.5192 0.5192 0.5500 0.5192 
Oat 1.21 1.21 1.50 1.21 
Rice 6.50 6.50 6.85 6.50 
Sorghum 1.71 1.89 2.08 1.89 
Soybean 5.26 4.92 5.20 4.92 
Wheat 2.58 2.58 3.00 2.58 
 
Table 2  Fixed Payment Rates ($/yield unit) 
 
Crop 2002 PFC House   Cochran-    
Roberts 
Senate Ag. Comm. 
    ’02-‘03  ‘04-‘05    ‘06 
Barley 0.20 0.25 0.3440 0.20 0.10 0.05 
Corn 0.26 0.30 0.4128 0.27 0.135 0.068 
Cotton 0.0556 0.0667 0.1418 0.13 0.065 0.0325 
Oat 0.021 0.025 0.0344 0.05 0.025 0.013 
Rice 2.04 2.35 3.23 2.45 1.225 0.6125 
Sorghum 0.31 0.36 0.4953 0.31 0.135 0.068 
Soybean 0.00 0.42 0.5779 0.55 0.275 0.138 
Wheat 0.46 0.53 0.7292 0.45 0.225 0.113 
 
Table 3  Target or Income Protection Prices ($/yield unit) 
 
Crop House Senate Ag. Comm. 
Barley 2.39 2.20 
Corn 2.78 2.35 
Cotton 0.7360 0.6800 
Oat 1.47 1.55 
Rice 10.82 9.30 
Sorghum 2.64 2.35 
Soybean 5.86 5.75 
Wheat 4.04 3.45 
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All of these programs would fall under the provisions of the WTO. The United 
States is a member of the WTO and has committed itself to limiting support to 
industry where such support affects the trade of goods and services. The WTO is the 
successor organization to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The 
GATT was established after World War II along with other international organizations 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The Uruguay Round of 
Multinational Trade Negotiations replaced the GATT institutional framework with an 
official organization (the WTO) to oversee international trade issues. 
There are sector-level trade agreements within the WTO. Agriculture is one of the 
sectors with such an agreement (often referred to as URAA, for Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture). Under the URAA, countries agreed to reduce agricultural 
protection and support through opening domestic markets to import competition, and 
by reducing domestic support and export subsidies. The market access provisions 
prohibit new non-tariff import barriers, convert existing non-tariff barriers into tariffs, 
and specify a reduction in tariff levels. The export subsidy provisions prohibit new 
export subsidies and reduce both the level of export subsidies and the quantities 
exported under them. The domestic support provisions target reductions in trade-
distorting domestic government policies.  
Many cite the WTO commitments made by the United States as being an 
important constraint on the design of future U.S. farm programs. Indeed much of the 
debate on the three proposals has centered on the “WTO compliance” of each. But 
many are confused about the specific nature of the U.S. commitments and their future 
importance. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap in understanding by 
providing a detailed explanation of the WTO agreement and estimates of whether the 
U.S. has fully complied with its WTO commitments in recent years. In addition, we 
project the degree of compliance through the 2002 marketing year. After this 
projection, we examine how each of three proposed farm bills would affect U.S. 
compliance.  
We find that the United States has met its WTO obligations in recent years. 
Furthermore, given no changes in the current policy mix, we project that the United 
States will continue to meet its commitments. However, some new policy proposals 
could jeopardize WTO compliance, particularly if WTO members adopt the recent 
U.S. proposal for more strict limits on agricultural support. The Proposal for 
Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural Trade Reform, submitted to the WTO by the 
United States, outlines additional reductions in trade-distorting practices above 
existing guidelines. 
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WTO Domestic Support Commitments 
I n the URAA, domestic support programs and policies are classified by their trade-distorting effects and their exemption status. The classifications are often described 
in terms of colored boxes: “green” for the least trade-distorting programs, “amber” for 
more trade-distorting programs, and “blue” for specific programs outlined in the 
agreement. Green-box and blue-box programs are exempt from WTO commitments. 
Amber-box programs may be exempt or may be limited under WTO commitments. So 
the analogy of a traffic stoplight adequately describes the range of domestic support 
programs under the URAA. Countries can continue (“go”) with all green-box and 
blue-box programs at any level of funding. Countries may continue to use amber-box 
policies as long as the expenditures on them do not exceed set levels (“proceed with 
caution”).  
The amber-box expenditure limit is based on the country’s agricultural support 
over a base period. For the United States, the base period covers the years 1986-1988. 
The value of domestic support in the amber box is called the aggregate measure of 
support (AMS). The countries that signed the URAA agreed to limit amber-box 
spending to a level at or below their AMS from their base period. Developed countries 
and confederations, such as the United States and the European Union, agreed to 20-
percent reductions in their AMS limits by 1999. The United States base period AMS 
is $23.9 billion. The current U.S. AMS limit is $19.1 billion. Within the amber box, 
programs can be exempted from the limits if their AMS amounts are considered too 
small to count. These exemptions are referred to as de minimis exemptions. 
The rules governing the placement of a domestic support program in its 
appropriate box are specific. Blue-box policies are production-limiting policies that 
base payments on fixed yields and acreage. Payments must be limited to 85 percent of 
the base level of production. The old U.S. target price – deficiency payment program 
that existed before 1996 was a blue-box program. Green-box policies are policies that 
have minimal trade impacts. Payments from green-box policies cannot be linked to 
current production and/or prices. The URAA lists several types of green-box policies 
and the guidelines that they must follow. The following program types can qualify for 
the green box: 
 1. general services,  
 2. public stockholding for food security purposes,  
 3. domestic food aid,  
 4. direct payments to producers,  
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 5. decoupled income support,  
 6. government financial participation in income insurance and income  
safety-net programs,  
 7. payments for relief from natural disasters,  
 8. structural adjustment assistance provided through producer or 
resource retirement programs,  
 9. structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids, 
 10. payments under environmental programs, and  
 11. payments under regional assistance programs. 
Each of these program types has guidelines that define the eligibility of the 
program for the green box. Any direct payments to producers provided by a 
government program cannot involve transfers from consumers (only taxpayers). Thus, 
green-box programs cannot support prices. The guidelines for decoupled income 
support are as follows: 
 1. eligibility for the program must be based on clearly defined criteria 
over a fixed base period; 
 2. payment amounts cannot be related to production, prices, or input 
usage after the base period; and 
 3. no production can be required to receive payments. 
For government-provided income insurance or safety-net programs to qualify for 
the green box, the requirements are as follows: 
 1. income and income loss can only be from agricultural sources; 
 2. loss must exceed 30 percent of average gross income (or an 
equivalent amount of net income), where average income is 
determined by a three-year average income (from the previous three 
years) or a five-year “olympic” average income (removing the high 
and low years before averaging); and 
3. if payments are provided by this program and by a natural disaster 
relief program, the total amount of payments cannot exceed 100 
percent of the producer’s total loss. 
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The requirements for natural disaster relief are as follows: 
 1. eligibility is determined by a formal disaster announcement from the 
government with at least a 30-percent production loss based on 
average production (the previous three-year average or the five-year 
“olympic” average); 
 2. payments may only be made on losses due to the disaster; 
 3. payments cannot be for more than the amount of loss and cannot be 
tied to requirements on future production; and  
 4. if payments are provided by this program and by a natural disaster 
relief program, the total amount of payments cannot exceed 100 
percent of the producer’s total loss. 
Producer retirement programs qualify for exemption if eligibility for the program 
is clearly defined according to criteria concerning the transition of the producer out of 
agricultural production, and if the payments are conditional on complete retirement 
from agricultural production. Resource retirement programs qualify under the 
following stipulations: 
 1. payments are conditional on the resource staying out of agricultural 
production for at least three years; 
 2. requirements cannot be placed on alternative use of the resource or 
other resources employed in agricultural production; and  
 3. payments cannot be related to any remaining agricultural production 
in which the producer is involved. 
Environmental program payments qualify for the green-box exemption if 
eligibility requirements are clearly defined and dependent on specific conditions, 
possibly involving production inputs or practices, and if the payment is limited to the 
extra cost or income loss the producer faces to be in compliance. Programs that fit 
these general types, but fail to meet the exemption conditions, and all other domestic 
support programs would fall into the amber box and would possibly be limited under 
the URAA. 
Amber-box policies can still be exempted from the AMS counted against a 
country’s limit if the policy is termed de minimis. For developed countries, a 5-percent 
rule is used. For commodity-specific support, a policy can be declared de minimis if 
the expenditures under the policy are less than 5 percent of the value of production for 
the commodity. For non-commodity-specific support, all such policies can be declared 
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de minimis if total expenditures under all of the policies are less than 5 percent of the 
total value of agricultural production in the country. 
WTO and the Current Farm Bil l  
T he WTO agreements have had and will continue to have effects on U.S. farm policy. The 1996 farm bill and any future farm bills fall under the requirements 
of the URAA and any successor agreements. To see how current U.S. farm programs 
fare under the URAA, we examine the classification of U.S. farm programs and why 
the programs are classified as they are. Countries typically submit reports on overall 
domestic support two to three years after the fact. The United States has submitted 
reports for the 1995-1998 marketing years. For current policies that were in place at 
that time, we can place them in the appropriate WTO boxes based on these 
submissions. For current policies created after 1998, we will place the policies based 
on our interpretation of the URAA. Other interpretations are possible. 
Current green-box domestic support comes from several of the program types 
discussed in the previous section. General services programs include the Agricultural 
Research Service, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Cooperative State Research, 
Extension, and Education Service, the Rural Business and Cooperative Development 
Service, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Grain Inspection, 
Packers, and Stockyard Administration, the Food Safety Inspection Service, the 
Agricultural Marketing Service, the Economic Research Service, the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, and the National Resource Conservation Service. 
These programs combined account for roughly $7 billion in domestic support 
annually. Domestic food aid accounts for over $30 billion annually, with most of this 
total being in the food stamp and child nutrition programs. 
PFC payments also fall into the green box as they are classified as decoupled 
income support. The construction of the PFC program follows the guidelines of a 
decoupled income support program that qualifies for exemption. Payment eligibility 
and amounts are based on historical production over a base period. Current production 
decisions (even the decision not to produce at all) cannot affect the payment. Given 
that there is no link between current production and PFC payments, these payments 
should have a very limited to nonexistent effect on future production and therefore are 
not considered trade distorting. 
Green-box natural disaster relief programs include the Non-insured Crop Disaster 
Assistance Program, the Livestock Indemnity Program, and emergency feed and 
forage programs. The Conservation Reserve Program qualifies as a resource 
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retirement program. Programs that facilitate structural adjustment through investment 
aids include the Farm Credit Program and State Mediation Grants. Environmental 
programs that qualify for exemption include the Agricultural and Emergency 
Conservation Programs, the Great Plains Conservation Program, the Water Bank 
Program, the Wetland Reserve Program, and the Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program. 
The United States has increased its green-box spending by a large amount over 
the past several years. Over the period 1986-1988, programs that would have qualified 
for the green box had total expenditures of, on average, just over $26 billion. From 
1996 to 1998, green-box spending had increased to an average of $50 billion. Because 
green-box spending is exempt from WTO limits, the United States can continue to add 
to this total. 
It is in amber-box spending that the United States could run afoul of the WTO and 
the URAA. Amber-box spending is limited under the URAA, and the United States, 
as a developed country, has agreed to reduce such spending by 20 percent from its 
1986-1988 average. This implies that the United States can spend up to $19.1 billion 
on amber-box programs. Figure 1 shows the AMS limits, actual AMS amounts for 
1996-1998, and our projections for AMS amounts for 1999 to 2002. Our projections 
are based on USDA figures for various program expenditures for 1998-2001, where 
possible, and USDA and FAPRI projections for 2002 figures or when actual data 
could not be obtained. 
The AMS is separated into commodity-specific and non-commodity-specific 
categories for the calculation of de minimis exemptions. For 1996-1998, the United 
States reported the following program payments or costs as commodity-specific 
domestic support: the dairy, sugar, and peanut price support/quota programs, 
marketing loan gains, loan deficiency payments, commodity loan forfeiture costs, 
cotton user marketing payments, dairy indemnities, mohair and wool support 
payments, rice marketing certificate payments, tobacco price related payments, 
commodity storage payments, and commodity loan interest subsidies. Over the same 
time, the United States reported these non-commodity-specific domestic support 
payments: estimated water subsidies from several Bureau of Reclamation projects, net 
federal outlays for livestock grazing on federal land, net crop insurance indemnities 
(insurance payments less producer-paid premiums) for both yield and revenue 
insurance policies, multi-year crop disaster payments, market loss assistance (MLA) 
payments, and state credit programs. 
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Marketing loan gains, loan deficiency payments, commodity storage payments, 
and commodity loan interest subsidies arise from the marketing loan programs. The 
price support and marketing loan program expenditures are classified as amber-box 
expenditures because payments depend on current production and prices. Given this 
link, the programs can influence future production decisions and have trade-distorting 
effects. Net crop insurance indemnities are also in the amber box because they do not 
meet the green-box requirements. The yield and revenue insurance policies are not 
income insurance policies; coverage above 70 percent is allowed; and the government 
does not have to declare a disaster for payments to begin. Thus, these policies cannot 
qualify for the green box as either income safety net programs or natural disaster relief 
programs. 
 
 
Figure 1  Total amber-box spending, payment caps, and de minimis exclusions 
 
Over the last four years, the federal government has augmented agricultural 
spending with emergency assistance packages. These packages included MLA and 
crop loss assistance payments for several commodities. The crop loss assistance 
payments were constructed to follow the guidelines for a natural disaster relief 
program and are exempt from WTO limits (i.e., they are green-box expenditures with 
the exception of the multi-year program). The MLA payments follow the same 
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payment formula as the PFC payments (which are in the green box), but the 
justification for the MLA payments was the low market prices we have seen over the 
last few years. Therefore, the MLA payments were placed in the amber box because 
the payments were triggered by (then) current market prices. The payment structure of 
the MLA programs is non-commodity-specific because current production has no 
impact on the payments. 
Table 4 displays the actual and projected values of production used in this 
analysis. The overall value of agricultural production has fallen since 1996. By 1999, 
the value of agricultural production had dropped to $183 billion, nearly $23 billion 
less than the 1996 value. The projections indicate that production values have 
increased since 1999 and will continue to do so. By 2002, agricultural production will 
be valued at over $197 billion. These production values affect the WTO standing of 
the United States, as they are used to evaluate U.S. domestic support versus the AMS 
limit. The de minimis exemptions are determined by comparing domestic support 
against 5 percent of the production value. 
Table 5 shows all of the amber-box expenditures before the de minimis 
exemptions are taken. These figures represent all possible expenditures that could 
count against the WTO limits. In 1996 and 1997, over $7 billion was spent on amber-
box programs. As prices deteriorated, marketing loan expenditures (loan deficiency 
payments, marketing loan gains, and commodity loan interest subsidies) grew. MLA 
payments were also appropriated. Thus, in 1998, amber-box spending rose to $15 
billion. In 1999 and 2000, spending rose to over $22 billion. Total amber-box outlays 
are expected to fall to under $20 billion in 2001. By 2002, changes in the dairy 
programs are scheduled to take effect and reinforce the decline in spending. Outlays 
are projected fall to $10 billion in 2002. Table 6 shows the expenditures that count 
against the U.S. AMS limit. The de minimis exemptions offset a sizable portion of the 
increase in amber-box spending. In 1996 and 1997, the U.S. AMS was roughly $6 
billion, with most of this support going to dairy producers. Only three products 
received enough support in 1996 to exceed the de minimis exemption level. By 1999, 
18 products had support exceeding the de minimis exemption level and the AMS had 
risen to over $16 billion. This amounted to 81 percent of the U.S. AMS limit. For 
2002, because prices are projected to rise, so will production values and de minimis 
exemption limits. This means that more spending could qualify for exemption. But 
increasing prices also imply smaller marketing loan outlays and reduced amber-box 
spending. By 2002, the U.S. AMS is projected to fall to less than $8 billion.  
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Table 4  Value of Production 
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Table 5  Aggregate Measures of Support (before de minimis exemptions) 
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Table 6  Aggregate Measures of Support (after de minimis exemptions) 
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WTO and the Proposed Programs 
W e have estimated expenditures for the 2002 marketing year under each of the three main farm bill proposals to see where they fit within the URAA and how 
they affect the U.S. AMS. For the Senate Agricultural Committee proposal, we have 
looked at two scenarios, the policy structures in 2002 and 2004, because the proposal 
makes explicit changes in how producers’ payments are delivered. Table 7 shows the 
levels of fixed payments and amber-box spending (both before and after de minimis) 
for the current farm bill and the various proposals. 
 
Table 7  Aggregate Measures of Support and Total Fixed Decoupled Payments 
 
 Current 
farm bill 
House Senate Ag. Comm. Cochran-
Roberts 
   ‘02 ‘04  
 ($ million) 
Fixed payments 4,008 5,242 8,425 4,233 8,069 
      
Before de 
minimis 
     
Commodity-
specific 
8,130 11,758 15,791 15,791 11,758 
Non-
commodity-
specific 
2,175 8,132 2,175 5,069 2,975 
Total 10,305 19,890 17,966 20,860 14,733 
      
After de minimis      
Commodity-
specific 
7,771 11,138 15,791 15,791 11,138 
Non-
commodity-
specific 
0 0 0 0 0 
Total 7,771 11,138 15,791 15,791 11,138 
 
All of the proposals keep the existing marketing loan, crop insurance, and fixed 
decoupled payment programs in place. Also, all of the proposals reinstate the dairy 
price support program. This implies that any additional expenditures from these 
proposals add to U.S. amber-box spending and possibly to the U.S. AMS (barring de 
minimis exemptions). Therefore, the probability that the U.S. would exceed its WTO 
domestic support limit would increase under these proposals. Our analysis shows that 
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amber-box spending that counts against the AMS limit would be higher under all of 
the proposals than it is under the current farm bill. However, all of the proposals 
would keep spending below the AMS limit, given projected price and production 
levels. The House and Cochran-Roberts proposals are projected to have $11 billion in 
expenditures that count against the limit; the Senate Agricultural Committee proposal 
is projected to spend $16 billion. 
But concentrating just on projected after – de minimis expenditures ignores part of 
the story. The various proposals also affect U.S. standing under the URAA by the 
categorization of the additional payments. The current farm bill is projected to have 
$14 billion in combined spending on fixed payments and amber-box spending (before 
de minimis). Each of the proposals would result in combined spending of at least $22 
billion. The House bill increases fixed payments by $1.2 billion, commodity-specific 
support by $3.6 billion, and non-commodity-specific support by $5.9 billion. All of 
the increase in commodity-specific spending comes from the dairy support program. 
The increase in non-commodity-specific support is due to the new countercyclical 
program in the House proposal. We classify this as non-commodity-specific because 
producers receive these payments whether they grow the payment crop or not. The 
Cochran-Roberts bill increases fixed payments by $4.0 billion, commodity-specific 
support by $3.6 billion, and non-commodity-specific support by $0.8 billion. The 
dairy program accounts for the commodity-specific increase, while government 
matching funds for the farm savings accounts make up the non-commodity-specific 
support increase. Thus, while the House and Cochran-Roberts proposals are projected 
to have the same amount count against the AMS limit, the Cochran-Roberts bill 
directs most of its increase in spending to green-box payments (which are exempt 
from WTO limits) and the House bill concentrates payments in the non-commodity-
specific amber box. This means that the House proposal has a higher probability of 
exceeding the WTO limit. If an additional $2 billion is spent on non-commodity-
specific support (either through higher crop insurance indemnities or countercyclical 
payments) under the House proposal, then the entire amount of non-commodity-
specific support would count against the limit and the U.S. would exceed the limit. 
With the 2002 policy structure under the Senate Agricultural Committee proposal, 
fixed payments increase by $4.4 billion, and commodity-specific support by $7.6 
billion. With the 2004 policy structure under the Senate Agricultural Committee 
proposal, fixed payments increase by $0.2 billion, commodity-specific support by 
$7.6 billion, and non-commodity-specific support by $2.9 billion. The commodity-
specific support increase is due to the dairy program and the increases in marketing 
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loan rates. The 2002 policy structure does not have any increase in non-commodity-
specific support, but the 2004 policy structure does. This is because the new 
countercyclical program in the Senate proposal is not in effect under the 2002 
structure, but under the 2004 structure fixed payments are lowered and the 
countercyclical program is projected to have expenditures. Thus, the Senate 
Agricultural Committee proposal trades green-box support for non-commodity-
specific amber-box support as time progresses. 
Concluding Comments 
A t the WTO ministerial meetings in Doha, Qatar, member countries agreed to an agenda for agriculture that would work towards elimination of trade-distorting 
subsidies. This goal is consistent with the proposal made by the United States in 2000 
for an extension to the URAA that would simplify the policy classifications down to 
exempt and non-exempt policies. AMS levels would again be reduced, with the final 
level being determined by a fixed percentage of the country’s total value of 
agricultural production in a fixed base period. The percentage would be the same for 
all participating countries. Exemption requirements would be rewritten to emphasize 
the limiting of trade-distorting practices. Criteria for the exemption of programs 
essential to food security and development in developing countries would be added. 
The reasoning behind this proposal is that it is both in our national and in our 
global interest to expand agricultural trade. By removing trade-distorting domestic 
support policies, countries are allowing agricultural producers to base production 
decisions on market and environmental signals. This will expand economic 
opportunity for the agricultural sector while addressing food security and 
environmental concerns. Consumers will also benefit through more competitive prices 
and a wider array of products. 
This official stance of U.S. negotiators clearly is not shared by U.S. domestic 
policy bodies as they propose to significantly expand U.S. support for agriculture. 
Much of the proposed support would count against the WTO commitments made by 
the United States. Of the three proposals, the Cochran-Roberts bill has the lowest 
likelihood of exceeding the AMS limit. The House and Senate Agricultural 
Committee proposals have higher likelihoods. This is due to additional non-
commodity-specific support under the House proposal and additional commodity-
specific support under the Senate Agricultural Committee proposal. 
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